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Résumé: Le propos de cet article est d'envisager les effets possibles du principe de 
précaution sur les règles du commerce international. En prenant en compte une 
interrogation sur la place légitime à reconnaître aux préférences collectives dans 
les accords sur le commerce, l'ambiguïté des usages du principe de précaution au 
regard de la coordination internationale et de l'émergence d'un ordre public 
planétaire est soulignée. Il existe une tension entre les institutions souveraines 
légitimes en charge de la prévention des risques collectifs et le besoin de 
coopération internationale pour traiter des risques supranationaux comme le 
changement climatique et l'érosion de la biodiversité. Au-delà, l'interférence des 
enjeux du commerce et de la protection de l'environnement sous l'égide du 
principe de précaution devrait provoquer une différenciation des règles du 
commerce applicables en fonction de la fiabilité de l'information donnée et des 
garanties apportées sur les conditions environnementales et sociales de 
production tout au long des filières de production et de distribution. Ce processus 
dépend de l'extension effective du concept pertinent de qualité des biens aux yeux 
des pouvoirs publics et des consommateurs. Ce qui est en jeu est l'ensemble des 
garanties techniques et de l'information que les producteurs devront apporter 
pour susciter la confiance et soutenir les relations d'échange. 
 
Abstract: The topic of this paper is to consider the possible impacts of the precautionary 
principle on international trade rules. In connection with questions pertaining to 
the legitimate place to give to collective preferences in trade agreements, it will 
begin by underlining the ambiguity of usages of the precautionary principle 
regarding the implementation of international coordination and the emergence of 
a global order. There is first an internal tension between the required sovereignty 
and legitimacy of institutions in charge of the prevention of collective risks and 
the need of international cooperation and coordination for supranational risks 
such as climate change and biodiversity loss. Beyond it can be expected that the 
coupling of environmental and trade issues under the precautionary principle 
will provoke a differentiation of rules of trades according to the reliance of 
information and guarantees on the environmental and social conditions of 
production all along the production chain. This process depends, as a cornerstone, 
of an extension of the concept of quality of goods relevant for public authorities 
and consumers. What is at stake is the whole set of technical guarantees and 
information that producers should bring to generate confidence and sustain trade 
relations. 
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Introduction 
The precautionary principle (PP) has been introduced and progressively acknowledged in 
environmental law for more than fifteen years. However, the level of acknowledgement is not 
the same in international, European and domestic law. Outside Europe, many countries still 
refuse to give it a legal force, although a reflection can be found in the SPS agreement1 and 
the present way to implement WTO rules (Noiville, 2000). Such reluctance against making 
this concept a legal norm is expressed in international texts such as the Framework 
Convention on climate change (FCCC) or the Rio Declaration adopted in 1992: these texts 
introduced reference to a “precautionary approach”2, not a “precautionary principle”. Within 
the European Union, the PP has been turned into a legal norm for environmental protection 
since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992; the EU regulation of food safety in 2002 has confirmed 
its relevance in the field of public health, which had previously been established by case law. 
The most prominent judgement of the European Court of Justice has been the 1998 one about 
the BSE embargo dispute between the UK government and the Commission. In October 2003, 
the Court credited the PP a status of general principle of European law (Solvay case). 
Meanwhile, sound elements of doctrine had been set-up by academic work and by 
thinking within administrative services, eventually legitimized by official policy statements in 
Europe. Stepping-stones to this regard are the Communication of the Commission in February 
2000 and the Resolution of the European Council held in Nice in December 2000. In France 
the PP has been incorporated in 1995 into a law aiming at reinforcing environmental 
protection in this country. Article 2 defines the principles that should inspire environmental 
protection and management (prevention at source, polluter-pays, participation and the PP3). 
After strong debates in the 2002-2004 period, the PP has received in 2005 a constitutional 
value, being integrated as one major article of the constitutional Charter of Environment 
expressing rights and obligations of people and public authorities in that field4. With this 
Charter, environmental protection rejoins major collective interests that are defended as 
constitutional values in France. 
                                                 
1 This agreement is one of the main components adopted when the World Trade Organisation was created in 
1994. It covers sanitarian and phyto-sanitarian aspects of international trade and defines the conditions under 
which national state authorities are allowed to take trade-restrictive measures in order to ensure a satisfying 
protection of the health of humans, animals and plants. 
2 For instance, the Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, which is not legally binding, reads: “In order to protect 
the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by states according to their capabilities. 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” 
3 This Law (95-101) defines the PP in the following terms: “the lack of certainty, under the present state of 
scientific and technological knowledge, should not lead to postpone effective and proportionate measures aimed 
at preventing threats of serious and irreversible damages to the environment at an acceptable economic cost” 
(personal translation from French). 
4 Following a positive vote of the Congress, on the 1st of March 2005, the President of French Republic 
promulgated the Constitutional law placing the Charter of Environment into the Constitution of this country. 
This Charter includes article 5 referring to the precautionary principle and specifying what is expected from 
public authorities facing uncertain threats of huge and irreversible damage to the environment. It reads: « When, 
although uncertain according to the present state of knowledge, a damage may happen and affect the 
environment hugely and irreversibly, public authorities, within the limits of their competencies, apply the 
precautionary principle; to this regard they look after the implementation of procedures of risk assessment and 
the adoption of temporary and proportionate measures to ward off the prospect of damage achievement » 
(personal translation from French). 
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In spite of this acknowledgement, there is still room for questions, debates and 
investigations on the meaning and effects of this new benchmark for different matters linked 
to environmental and health issues. The topic of this paper is to consider the possible impacts 
of the PP on international trade rules. This is concomitant with rising demands that collective 
preferences should be acknowledged in trade agreements. The departure point to this regard is 
an observation of the huge ambiguity of the PP regarding the implementation of international 
coordination and the emergence of a global order. There is an internal tension between the 
required sovereignty and legitimacy of institutions in charge of the prevention of collective 
risks and the need of international cooperation and coordination for addressing supranational 
risks such as climate change and biodiversity loss. Beyond, it can be expected that the 
coupling of environmental and trade issues under the PP will provoke a differentiation of 
rules of trades according to the reliance of information and guarantees on the environmental 
and social conditions of production all along the production chain. This process depends, as a 
cornerstone, of an extension of the concept of quality of goods relevant for public authorities 
and consumers. What is at stake is the whole set of technical guarantees and information that 
producers should bring to generate confidence and sustain trade relations. 
 
1. A slight return on the precautionary principle 
The progressive acknowledgement of the PP by EU and French law did not put an end to all 
sources of confusion and false debates about its content and consequences. Business circles, 
health care professions, local communities representatives have expressed various fears. They 
said that the pace and level of technological innovation, economic activity, quality of public 
decision-making and quality of medical services will be hurt. Some of them feign to believe 
that the PP will stop all scientific progress, block economic growth, severely damage social 
welfare and turn upside down basic values of a free society. On the opposite side, some NGOs 
would have wanted that, under the PP, a more radical concept would have been adopted. I 
named this alternative concept the ‘abstention principle’; it asks to avoid any possible risk for 
the environment and public health by imposing a shifting of the burden of proof5. Total safety 
of a new product or technology would have to be proven before any authorization could be 
given. Both sides join in their wrong understanding of the aim and content of the PP, in spite 
of the existing doctrine developed in official statements since 2000. 
 
The abstention principle 
The abstention principle (AP) is very far from the PP indeed. It has often been defended on 
the basis of the work of German philosopher Hans Jonas (1984) on the ‘Imperative of 
Responsibility’ of present generations regarding the preservation of the ultimate possibility to 
maintain a truly human life on planet Earth. Flawed by logical inconsistency – with a science 
                                                 
5 Defining the PP by the reversed burden of proof (proving safety and not proving the damage) is the central 
point of misunderstanding between the US experts and governmental circles on one side and the EU thinking on 
the other side: whereas the former (Raffensperger & Tickner, 1999; Graham, 2004) think that the PP makes it 
legally binding to prove harmlessness against all potential hazards, which is quite impossible, the latter consider 
that, as far as practical matters are concerned, there is no general rule regarding the burden of proof; moreover, 
what is to be proven is not harmlessness as such, but that a cautious approach has been followed by using 
existing science, for instance in the framework of procedures of administrative authorisation required to put new 
products on the market. 
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permanently in progress but never completed, there is a logical impossibility of proving “there 
are and will be no harmful effects”- the AP could only lead to an impossible general ‘zero 
risk’ norm for potential risks. The moral philosophy of Jonas explicitly targeted potentially 
apocalyptic events only, those that put into peril the very physical and moral existence of 
Humanity, but was not supposed to be appropriate to more ordinary human activities that 
have potentially serious, but non-apocalyptic impacts on the environment or human health. 
Due to scarcity of public resources and the pressure of other needs, the AP would not only be 
very costly in welfare terms but unfeasible: zero risk in one potential case would mean more 
risk in other cases. What would happen in practice would be an arbitrarily selective use of the 
rule, implying high direct or opportunity costs6. 
 
The precautionary principle: earliness and proportionality 
The PP obliges authorities to take an early account of potential hazards, but it does not ask to 
block any product, substance, technology or project because a potential hazard has not be 
demonstrated not to exist. The key idea regarding the type of measures that have to be taken is 
proportionality: European and French doctrine converge on the idea that the PP asks to take 
an early but proportionate account of hazards, without waiting their full scientific 
establishment. It is mainly a norm shifting the moment at which a threat of risk is considered 
for action. Then authorities can use a large range of measures in the name of the PP, from 
specific research programmes and information dissemination to incentives, partial restrictions 
of use, suspension of an authorization, and ultimately strict forbidding. Forbidding a new 
activity is just one possibility among others and, having extreme consequences, needs strong 
and specific justifications, having in view the high level of environmental and health safety 
proclaimed by EU treaties and law texts. 
Clearly the PP can do nothing for situations of informed ignorance, i.e. when after 
having used all resources of existing scientific knowledge it is not possible to give a face to a 
theoretic possibility that an unknown hazard exists. The PP can only address potential hazards 
previously identified as relevant hypotheses on a scientific base. 
The counterpart of earliness is that adopted measures have to be conceived as 
provisory; they have to be flexible enough to be regularly revised on the basis of new 
scientific knowledge and information. Hence the PP reinforces the dynamical links between 
public decision-making and scientific activity although it gives less critical weight to the stage 
of scientific proof. 
To sum-up, the PP defines the attitude to adopt when facing scientifically uncertain 
threats. It sets the basis of a new concept of action, one that is flexible, step-by-step, 
reversible and sensitive to new scientific information as for an experiment. It has similarities 
with the rationale of the economic concept of quasi-option value in uncertain context with 
prospect of improving information and various degrees of irreversibility of actions, or 
consequences of action (Henry, 1974). 
 
                                                 
6 For a deeper examination of the Jonas’ theory and an explanation of the reason why it could not offer the 
appropriate conceptual basis for implementing the PP, see Godard (2002) and Godard et al. (2002). 
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2. An ambivalent use in international contexts  
From the viewpoint of international relations, the PP is curiously ambiguous. On the one 
hand, it has been mobilised to justify huge progress in international cooperation; examples 
can be found in the main agreements and texts adopted by the international community at the 
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, for instance the FCCC. Here states jointly 
acknowledged the necessity to take preventive action in spite of remaining uncertainties and 
settled a common framework of action, from which the Kyoto Protocol (1997) has been 
derived7. On the other hand, the PP has also been used to suspend the effects of international 
rules previously agreed, specifically trade rules. Typical example in the EU is offered by the 
mad cow crisis in Europe in mars 1996, when national governments and the Commission 
decided to put UK beef exports under embargo, a measure that head-on opposed the principle 
of freedom of circulation of goods within the European space. Another typical case is the 
dispute opposing the EU to the United States and other countries regarding imports of beef 
bred with growth-enhancing hormones into the EU territory. Such measures have been 
justified by the potential threats to human or animal health, although damages envisaged were 
not at the time fully established by scientific methods. In these cases, the PP is used as a 
means to justify sovereign unilateral measures, based on unilateral judgements, as an 
exception to the ordinary regime of agreed rules of trade. In both examples, the disputing 
parties initiated legal procedures - a suit before the European Court of Justice in one case, a 
formal complaint before the dispute resolution body of the WTO in the other case -, meaning 
that views on appropriate conditions of risk management were not shared internationally. 
Why such opposite directions for the use of the PP? I think it is not only a matter of 
different circumstances calling for different solutions. Regarding public goods and still more 
global public goods, as in the environmental field, the PP is torn between the need of a broad 
international cooperation, adapted to the very nature of issues, and the deep attachment to 
assigning responsibility for ensuring safety of persons and the community to politically 
legitimate sovereign bodies, i.e. to national state governments. For example, the Carthegena 
Protocol on bio-safety has defined a regime of prior authorization by the importing country 
for any transaction related to GMOs; it acknowledged the legal capability of the importing 
country to refuse one proposed import in the name of potential risks not yet confirmed by 
scientific investigations, including social and economic consequences of possible ecological 
effects. How should we understand this legal provision? Is it really the best means to preserve 
biodiversity on Earth, which is one of the main ultimate goals of the Convention to which the 
Protocol is affiliated, or is it just the acknowledgement of a political space of expression of 
specific national collective preferences within the international trade rules? 
 
3. On sovereignty and the management of public risks 
The standard foundation 
Quite evidently sovereignty is a complex multi-dimensional idea. Sovereignty of the nation-
state cannot stand alone. For Western thinking it has to be founded on the sovereignty of the 
people (a community of citizens), which also ultimately refers to the fundamental rights of 
individuals. The sovereignty of a state is only legitimate if the latter satisfies its obligations 
                                                 
7 This Protocol entered into force in February 2005, without the participation of Australia and the United States. 
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towards its citizens. Among them, one of the most important is personal safety as a condition 
of personal freedom. The state has the duty to protect the citizens as well as it is necessary to 
organize the state in such a way to protect citizens against threats to be imposed an arbitrary 
power by it. 
The principle of sovereignty of nation-states has been the standard basis of 
development of modern international law. The nature of the latter differs a lot from the one of 
domestic law, since international law is built by conventions freely negotiated between parts 
on the basis of their mutual interest. No world government can legally imposes measures and 
actions that sovereign states do not want, even if these measures are intended to achieve some 
common good of Humanity. To this regard the Organization of United Nations can clearly not 
be seen as playing the role of a world government. 
 
An emergent alternative foundation, still minor but with a growing influence 
During the eighties, an alternative foundation of international environmental law began to 
emerge. It adopted the concept of Common Patrimony of Humanity as a central concept, one 
that was previously used by UNESCO for the cultural patrimony and by the Law of the Sea 
for organizing access to deep marine resources8. This was potentially something as a 
theoretical revolution in international law. Humanity was then defined as a collective person, 
the interests of which had to be defended and having the highest rank among all possible 
interests, higher than states. This construct allows to reversing the traditional view on states 
obligations and rights. Individual states would be considered as representatives and guardians 
of fundamental interests of Humanity, being accountable of their practices and achievements 
before the community of all states. With this new foundation, asymmetric and uncompensated 
obligations might weigh on states every time major interests of Humanity are of concern 
because of their external actions or domestic management. 
The development of this alternative foundation of law has paradoxically been stopped 
in 1992, at the very moment when one expected its consecration, by the Convention on 
biodiversity. Adopted around the Rio Summit, this convention abandoned the concept of 
Common Patrimony of Humanity that had been proposed by preparatory works as legal status 
for genetic resources. Instead, the Convention strongly affirmed the sovereignty of states on 
the genetic resources present on their territory. The reason is to be found in what was felt as a 
deception by less-developed countries: access to biotechnologies produced by industrialised 
countries would have been made costly and limited by rules of intellectual property (patents 
and other protection means), whereas the access to the natural resources they possess would 
have been offered for free to anyone because the latter would have been stated a common 
patrimony! In spite of this sudden stopping, the movement is slowly and indirectly in progress 
through the extension of human rights (negotiations on new economic and social rights) and 
the emergence of a doctrine of humanitarian interference in domestic situations. It is also 
sustained by the action of main international NGOs, the discourse of which is full of 
references to the rights of all citizens of the world and survival of Mankind. 
 
                                                 
8 On this emergence, see Kiss (1989). See also the historical development of international eco-politics described 
by Le Prestre (2005). 
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Towards a new hybrid concept of sovereignty 
If this new look on states’ status and obligations get an extended influence in the future, it 
would change a lot the approach of international coordination to address global issues such as 
climate change. For them, the conventional concept of sovereignty locks action in dead-end of 
free-riding and prisoner’s dilemma. The more a coalition include states by numbers, the more 
outsiders are incited to stay outside since they get the best of both worlds: access to a public 
good paid by other states without having to pay for it and even taking economic advantage on 
competitive international markets. The alternative foundation of sovereignty sets a new right 
of a coalition of “good-willing states for the Humanity’s sake”9 to look after the behaviours of 
rogue states who refuse to care for the global environment. Working for the common good of 
Humanity would then create a new right of states that take part to the coalition not to be 
penalized in economic competition just because they care for common interests of the 
Humanity. For instance they would be entitled to take measures of economic protection, such 
as carbon taxes at borders on imports from rogue states that free ride regarding the collective 
effort of controlling greenhouse gas emissions. 
On this basis I suggest a synthesis. States have two types of obligations. The first one 
is to ensure the safety of peoples and citizens before which they are accountable. Would one 
rule of trade come into contradiction with this first obligation, there is no doubt that the rule 
of trade would be ignored or suspended, whatever treaties would have been signed. According 
to the second one, states are the guardians of common interests of Humanity and, for this, are 
accountable before the whole human community – not only other states - for what they do at 
home regarding human rights and the management of common resources and life conditions 
on Earth. 
This is the context in which the issue of collective preferences can be thought of. 
 
4. Links between collective preferences and the precautionary 
principle 
The PP is a norm and a benchmark to address situations of scientific uncertainty on potential 
damage to health and the environment. At first sight, it is a rather technical and limited norm 
for specific situations intensely depending on scientific expertise. However, there are also 
subtle links with the issue of collective preferences. Such links are based notably on the 
current reference, in the context of discussions on trade and risks to health, to the so-called 
“other legitimate factors”. My overall judgment is that these links are necessary but 
dangerous, because of huge possibilities of confusion and skidding. 
 
                                                 
9 Clearly some cautious procedural rules and conditions would have to be defined to authenticate that some 
initiatives are really taken for the common good of Humanity: referring to an enforceable multilateral convention 
(for instance the Kyoto protocol as linked to the UNFCCC); gathering a sufficient quorum of participating states, 
and so on. However, international unanimity could not be required. 
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Opening the black box of collective preferences 
First of all, it is necessary to open the black box of collective preferences in order to identify 
what is relevant and what is not. Many different things may be included under this category. 
I suggest considering a list of couples: 
- Are we talking about preferences on collective rules or for specific goods? Collective 
rules belong to the realm of politics and sovereignty to the extent the latter has not 
been delegated to supra-state levels. Political autonomy regarding rule setting belongs 
to the core of a democratic life. If parts of sovereignty have been transferred to supra-
state bodies for some matters, new democratic procedures should also be put into 
place at these higher levels to achieve a legitimate equilibrium. The standard 
accusation against the present state of affairs is that transfers of power and sovereignty 
to international bodies have not been accompanied by a parallel extension of 
democratic control on these new bodies. Things being what they are, the emergence of 
a claim for collective preferences is a means to recall the insufficient democratic 
legitimacy of international organisations such as WTO, since their governing bodies 
only represent states and not the peoples. 
- Regarding goods, are we talking of private goods or public ones? For private goods 
that do not have a tutelary dimension, competitive markets are the appropriate 
responses and so-called collective preferences are just then a statistical aggregate of 
market equilibriums. They offer no basis for state intervention at the borders. There is 
also no connection with the PP. On the contrary, public goods have to be produced or 
preserved by public authorities and, whereas economic arguments and calculus are 
proposed to define their optimal levels of production or protection, the dependency 
towards public institutions inevitably make those goods enter a public arena that is 
submitted to political games and public justification requirements. Then the specific 
procedures and institutions set-up in each country to provide those goods can be seen 
as expressing a sort of collective preference. They may belong to the block of 
sovereignty of each country, but some countries may want to change them and agree 
on new common procedural rules. 
- Are we talking of an aggregation of individual preferences of consumers or truly 
collective preferences, i.e. preferences of the political community as such? In the 
former case, the positive observation of trade relations and market equilibriums has no 
specific political meaning. There is no reason to interfere with trade rules if they 
ensure an open choice on competitive markets. If distributive issues have to be 
addressed, specific means of redistribution have to be considered. In the case of truly 
collective preferences, we are dealing with democratic and political processes that 
involve issues of representation and deliberation. The international trade order has to 
acknowledge and respect the role and place of such democratic processes and of 
public bodies that bear them, inasmuch the latter respect basic rights of individuals 
and economic agents. 
With this case, differences are important beyond the use of the same word 
“preferences”. Differences are not only marking the procedures involved (market on 
one side, and deliberation, representation, vote and arbitration on the other side) but 
also the very nature of preferences: individual preferences of consumers express, this 
O. Godard - The precautionary principle, collective preferences and international trade -8- 
is a tautology, the unique specific preferences of each individual regarding the bundle 
of goods she wants to consume. Individuals do not have to justify such preferences, 
expressing personal taste. Quite different is the nature of collective preferences 
concerning rules or future orientations of a political community. They also depend on 
a process of aggregation of individual preferences into a collective choice but the raw 
material is supposed to be the reflexive view that each citizen has on the common 
good, not his contingent personal taste for private matters. Each individual has then to 
abstract from personal features and source of attachments (family links, place of 
childhood, vested interests, and so on) in order to identify what are the best options for 
the community to which he belongs. This is the reason why Rousseau’s approach of 
general interest commanded to lessen all intermediate communities and guilds, 
perceived as obstacles on the way towards the true interest of the overall national 
community. The Rawls’ veil of ignorance aimed at achieving the same result of 
abstraction from individual peculiarities (Rawls, 1971). 
 
The precautionary principle and collective preferences 
Let us now consider to which extent the PP is concerned by collective preferences and to 
which extent it should be maintained at good distance from them. The PP is mainly concerned 
through the idea of proportionality. Precautionary measures have to be calibrated according to 
the level of four types of variables: possible damage, safety goals, direct and opportunity costs 
of measures and, last but not least, the scientific consistency of hypotheses of hazards –the 
less a hypothesis is scientifically documented and supported, the less stringent can 
legitimately be the measures, all things being equal -. 
The first three variables depend ultimately on collective preferences, under the 
different forms they can take: for the damage, it is primarily an issue of aggregation of 
individual (dis)utilities; for the level of safety, this is both an issue of individual choice and 
collective preference, taking account of important political aspects such as the distribution of 
threats and exposures to hazards among social groups; the cost dimension involves both 
private costs, collective costs and the use of public funds under democratic control. There is 
no reason why different countries would share the same relative values and should make the 
same trade-off, whatever the differences of their situations. Think for instance of the value 
practically acknowledged to the loss of a statistical human life… 
Regarding the fourth variable, it would largely reflect national specificities in 
organising scientific expertise and defining patterns of relations between experts and 
decision-makers; it would also depend on the counter-factual scenario chosen as a reference to 
assess hazards: for instance are we going to compare GMOs with modern intensive 
agricultural practices or only with organic culture? According to which one is chosen, GMOs 
will appear more or less dangerous than the reference. Whereas science is supposed to aim at 
universal procedures for a universal knowledge, expertise is inescapably influenced by 
contexts of action, which depend on specific features of public life of each country or 
international scenes to which expertise is attached. All these elements of proportionality are to 
some extent affected by the political process determining collective preferences; hence they 
cannot be detached from the block of sovereignty. So there are good reasons why measures 
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taken in the name of the PP are not the same from one country to another. And these reasons 
are not that some countries are right and the others wrong. 
This being said, the exact account taken of collective preferences should only be 
linked to an assessment of environmental and health hazards within the general constraints of 
proportionality and coherence among measures adopted for similar risks: collective 
preferences cannot legitimately justify that products generating analogous risks are treated in 
an asymmetrical way, just because some would be imported and others would be national 
products. Beyond, collective preferences have to stay apart from the PP. It is with scepticism 
and reluctance that I consider the ambiguous reference to these “other legitimate 
considerations” that have been introduced in international discussions in relation to the PP. 
For instance, should public authorities base the choice of measures on the public perception of 
risks, or on a scientific assessment? On both of them? Is the matter an issue of risk 
management or of management of public opinion? It may be legitimate for public authorities 
to take measures in order to preserve the public order and restore social trust; however the 
latter should not be permitted to be disguised as safety measures when they do not 
significantly contribute to improve safety. To this regard the EU Commission has been 
somewhat too far, introducing confusion in ideas and “good reasons”. Such confusion is an 
obstacle for a larger international acknowledgement of the PP. It is critical for public 
authorities not to use the PP as a joker to cover a radical lack of scientific justification and 
disguise commercial protectionist motivations or other preferences not linked to risk 
management. 
 
5. Which links between trade and environment? 
Over the past thirty years, health and environmental protection policies, on the one hand, and 
competition and international trade rules, on the other, have developed along largely separate 
lines, in spite of the formulation of principles such as the polluter-pays principle (OECD, 
1975). During this period, two parallel developments have occurred: first, the emergence of 
global environmental problems, such as the hole in the ozone layer, deteriorating biodiversity 
and the risk of a major change of climate; and, secondly, a gradual liberalization of world 
trade and growing economic interdependency of activities conducted in the various regions of 
the world. These two trends have been accompanied by new institutional developments, 
particularly on the international scene, including the Montreal Protocol, the UNFCCC, the 
UN Biodiversity Convention and Agenda 21, on the one hand; and the conclusions of the 
Uruguay Round, notably the SPS Agreement and the creation of the WTO, on the other. Both 
types of issues imply different equilibriums between state sovereignty and international 
coordination. Hence growing frictions that the PP amplifies. Hence new questions: which 
objective should be senior and, consequently, which branch of international law should 
prevail? Or, put less black and white, how should these two fundamental developments be 
joined in a coherent and balanced way? 
Although development of world trade is not intrinsically incompatible with health and 
environmental protection, expansion of trade under modern technological conditions 
undeniably modifies the conditions on which the latter can be provided. There are broad 
circumstances in which these objectives do not converge easily. Health protection objectives 
have traditionally prompted governments to impose restrictions on circulation of animals, 
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agricultural products and foods. Governments may therefore consider themselves justified in 
limiting importation of products that could affect the safety standards they believe necessary 
to maintain for local consumers and citizens. Such measures frequently trigger commercial 
tension, since exporters tend to consider them inappropriate actions and suspect them to 
protect special commercial interests.  
 
Initial basic distinctions among situations 
Certainly clarifying issues by introducing a few basic distinctions regarding environmental 
issues is useful at this stage. Some issues are local (most water pollution begins by local 
effects), others are regional (Europe, Asia, Africa); still others are global (climate change). 
Some issues arise because of production processes and other because of consumption and 
waste generation. 
From a standard economic viewpoint, local environmental problems generated by 
production activities should be managed according preferences of local groups and population 
who are affected. Thus there is no point to impose uniform standards throughout the world. 
When issues are generated by consumption, the same line of argument entitles public 
authorities of the states in which consumption takes place, or waste management has to be 
tackled, to take the responsibility of measures chosen on the basis of the preferences of these 
consumer states. There is no economic reason why these states should renounce to their own 
authentic preferences and align on the preferences of exporter countries. The only 
counterweight to a splitting of standards could be brought by the mutual benefits of a 
standardization of requirements because of economies of scale in production and distribution 
of internationally traded goods. For instance, take the issue of regimes of packaging waste 
treatment (selective collection and sorting in view of recycling, reduction at source, disposal 
in landfills): here, the preferences of the consumer country are the legitimate reference to set 
up incentives, requirements and standards about packaging use, whatever difficulties it could 
bring to exporters wanting to enter the market, under the limit of a non-discriminatory 
approach (Buclet & Godard, 2000; Buclet, 2002). 
For a global public good such as climate, the issue is framed differently: ideally a 
global institutional framework is necessary to set-up a unified economic regime allowing to 
overcome free-riding incentives and to allocate efforts of abatement of net emissions 
worldwide cost-effectively. Even in that case, all countries will not be touched by climate 
change the same way and do not share the same priorities and trade-off between more 
immediate consumption and protection of the public good. These features make efficiency 
and distributive justice more entangled than elsewhere: it would not be sufficient to have one 
unique price for carbon on a world market to maximize the world welfare in connection to 
climate change; the initial distribution of obligations and rights will also matter to take 
account of different expositions to climatic hazards and different priorities. Meanwhile, these 
important distributive issues should not alter the regime of circulation of abatements 
obligations or greenhouse gas quotas if allocative efficiency is aimed at. For instance, in the 
context of the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, a principle of liability of the seller has 
been adopted, which means that on the paper there is no distinction to be made between tons 
of CO2, once they have been bought by a country, whatever the seller. 
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Environmental globalization at work 
Basic analytical distinctions being made, we have to go one step further in acknowledging 
that several processes are putting this intellectual order into question. The distinction between 
local and global problems, particularly, tends to be significantly attenuated. Globalization is 
also at work regarding the look cast on environmental issues. We can observe two 
concomitant mechanisms to this regard. One of the principles underlying action by NGOs 
devoted to environmental protection is to give the largest possible scope and meaning to local 
crises and events by including them in issues with planetary significance, such as preservation 
of biodiversity, prevention of climate-related risks, the fight against encroachment of the 
desert or growing global scarcity of some critical natural resources (soils for cultivation, 
water, oil and so on). They also endeavor to give maximum worldwide publicity to certain 
local practices of international business considered incompatible with what they consider to 
be the requirements of sustainable development or environmental protection. In response, 
multinational companies, which need to maintain their reputation and legitimacy, have begun 
to care about the extra local implications of accidents for which they are liable and of 
environmental carelessness at their production units, even when their behavior is satisfying 
local regulations of the host country. For various reasons, most transnational companies have 
decided to enforce the same level of environmental management rules at their industrial 
facilities throughout the world. This way, the basis on which environmental policies are based 
tends to become broader and escape local contexts. It then extends the sphere of relevance of 
processes of definition of common or harmonized international environmental rules, thereby 
deviating from a standard economic representation of local individual preferences. 
 
New concerns leading to a broader concept of quality of goods 
The growing concern expressed by consumers, NGOs and major retailers, especially in 
Europe, about the health risks generated by the consumption of certain foods and the 
environmental impact of the production chain used to extract natural resources and produce 
goods imported by industrialized countries, has resulted in a new approach to product quality. 
For instance, suppliers must certify that the wood used in furnishings come from forests 
managed according to rules of sustainability; they must offer indirect guarantees that beef 
does not contain prions by certifying that the cattle was raised at a given farm in a given 
region where no recycled beef waste was incorporated as protein adds to feed them; they must 
certify that certain peas did not grow in fields fertilized with liquid or urban manure over a 
period of at least five years, etc. The distinction between process and product is then 
challenged every time the quality of goods is a critical issue and certification of this quality 
depends on the capacity to certify the quality of the production chains according to safety and 
environmental criteria. 
This new broader approach of the quality of goods tends to enlarge and get more 
complex the informational basis required to sustain trade relations. To be internationally 
traded in the coming era of precaution, sensitive products must be supported by all sorts of 
information: producing analyses of life cycles, meeting various thresholds standards in 
relation to the components of a product, mentioning what is in and what is not, producing 
environmental management certificates and traceability indicators going upwards for an 
identification of economic and geographical origins. Same sorts of demands of information 
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also arose regarding social aspects and working conditions at the production place. As an 
economic institution, the marketplace had often been glorified as an efficient device with 
minimum informational requirements, with the idea that prices could synthesize all 
information that buyers could need. To this regard, a standard market can be said an 
institution of oblivion, a means to put a veil on far distant concrete conditions of production. 
This is precisely what is being put into question with the emergence of the questions of health 
hazards, environmental problems and human rights and, as a response, with the symmetrical 
emergence of new characters of citizen-consumers. For instance the last mad-cow disease 
crisis in Europe (1996-2000) has been a moment of sharp unveiling, for consumers, of what 
modern technical and economic conditions for raising cattle and producing food were really 
made. 
Without breaking with the need for a scientific approach, the PP definitely differs from 
the traditional positivistic approach to scientific proof. Its gradual inclusion in international 
law will necessarily modify the technical and political foundations of trade, since the various 
regions of the world will most likely have a different idea of acceptable risks, of a right and 
well-conducted expertise or even of the very nature of the scientific elements to consider 
legitimately within such an expertise. 
 
New patterns of trade chains framed by informational constraints and broader 
quality requirements 
For products carrying a health risk or resulting from an environmentally sensitive 
manufacturing process, trade networks will have to align with the new information 
requirements and accept either of the following alternatives: either they will have to find ways 
to provide the information required to certify quality while preserving a mass manufacturing 
approach based on blending and long trade channels, or they will have to move towards 
smaller and specialized production and distribution chains with precise specifications, 
adjusting the size of trade channels to the guarantees they will be able to offer as regards the 
environmental and health quality of their production chains. 
On the basis of the analysis developed in this paper, let me put forward a conjecture: 
contrary to what is often forecast - a huge process of convergence towards uniform liberal 
trade rules for all goods on a world market -, I think that the future will bring a differentiation 
of several regimes of international circulation of goods, at least if environmental and health 
issues continue to catch interest of consumers and governments. It will add on other “good 
reasons” to control and restrain trading for certain goods such as defense-sensitive 
technologies. We may at least identify three theoretic regimes in relation to health and 
environmental safety: 
- ordinary goods showing no quality uncertainty; not being suspected for unknown 
health and environmental reasons they will be traded according to liberal rules once 
they meet commonly agreed technical standards (cars, gasoline, computers, books, 
…), 
- specific goods with stringent limitations and controls on trade flows, as in the case of 
dangerous and toxic waste or protected endangered animal species; restrictions are 
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then designed to avoid or limit trade on the basis of a principle of geographical 
proximity, 
- goods the circulation of which is profiled by the capacity of producers to bring all the 
required information and guarantees on the health and environmental aspects of the 
whole producing chain; these goods crystallize a new broader concept of quality, 
enlarged to potential risks, having to meet precautionary requirements; different views 
on acceptable levels of risks will draw circulation areas in which the same level of 
potential risks are accepted by common consent, as is illustrated by the geographical 
distribution of areas in which cultivation of GMOs is permitted. In some cases, new 
opportunities for alternative trade patterns will develop on the basis of short chains of 
distribution and mutual knowledge of producers and consumers. Beyond information 
issues, this new context will induce change in the choice of production and 
distribution techniques, notably putting into question mass undifferentiated pooling 
and mix of raw materials when these materials are critical in determining the expected 
broader quality of goods. 
 
When new conditions of international trade de facto impose a hybrid 
sovereignty 
Let us finally interpret these emergent processes in the context of the previous discussion on 
sovereignty. They clearly put into question the classical concept of absolute state sovereignty 
and work at extending a mutual right of cross-examination among states about what they are 
doing domestically in relation with the environmental and social impacts of production. 
Amazingly, it is through trade relations, and not by solemn international political 
breakthroughs, that sovereignty of states is at the same time expanded (a community is 
entitled to ask another one to be accountable regarding environmental and health 
consequences of domestic activity) and limited (a community is asked to be accountable 
before others for what it does domestically). Under a regime in which the PP becomes an 
acknowledged norm of international law, sovereignty becomes hybrid; it incorporates new 
rights and new obligations and generates new sources of tensions that will have to be 
contained. 
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